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IMCO: An Environmentalist's
Perspective
Eldon V. C. Greenberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE AGE of the "oilberg," true to the warnings of Noel Most-
ert, may well be upon us.
In the last year, major oil tanker accidents have occurred
with a disconcerting regularity. In August 1974, the 206,000 dead-
weight ton Metula ran aground in the Straits of Magellan, ulti-
mately spilling more than 50,000 tons of oil into the sea. Five
months later, another "supertanker," the Showa Maru, carrying
237,000 tons of crude oil from the Arabian Gulf to Japan, struck a
reef in the Straits of Malacca, spilling approximately 4,500 tons
of oil. Later that month, the 88,000 deadweight ton tanker Jakob
Maersk ran aground off the coast of Portugal, and all of its cargo
either spilled into the water or burned in the subsequent fire, result-
ing in the largest cargo loss since the Torrey Canyon. All told,
in the years 1969-1973, more than 3,000 tanker accidents occurred
worldwide, resulting in more than 450 polluting incidents and in a
total loss of more than 7 million barrels of oil.'
The frequency of tanker accidents has been coupled with the
growth of the total amount of oil discharged into the oceans from
normal tanker operations. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, after surveying the Atlantic Ocean off the coast
of the United States, has reported that "oil globules . .. in mas-
sive proportions infect nearly 700,000 square miles of blue water
from Cape Cod to the Caribbean Sea."2 Scientists at the Ber-
muda Biological Station for Research have estimated that, at any
one time, at least 700,000 tons of pelagic tar are floating in the
oceans, and that estimate might easily be low by a factor of three.3
* Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C. Portions
of this article will appear in a forthcoming book review by the same author in the
Louisiana Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
I Card, Ponce & Snider, Tank Ship Accidents and Resulting Oil Outflows, 1969-1973,
in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD, 1975 CONFERENCE ON THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
OIL POLLUTION 205 (1975).
2 Fish Larvae Found in Environment Contaminated with Oil and Plastic
(Mar Map Red Flag Report No. 1, Jan. 18, 1973).
3J. BUTLER, B. MORRIS & J. SASS, PELAGIC TAR FROM BERMUDA AND THE
SARGASSO SEA 97-99 (1973).
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Summing up the current state of knowledge, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences has stated:
Tar masses are appearing in increased quantity in formerly un-
polluted areas such as the East Coast of Africa, the beaches of
Southern France, and many islands in both the Indian and At-
lantic Oceans. . . . [M]ost of these materials originate from
tanker washings and bilge discharges, rather than diffused
sources of petroleum input or seeps.4
More than 11/2 billion tons of oil a year are currently transported
by tanker, and of that total, probably more than 2 million tons are
ultimately lost in the oceans.5 Just how much this traffic, with its
attendant pollution, will grow in the next 10 or 15 years, given
the vagaries of international politics and the will of the OPEC
nations, is unclear. But it will almost certainly grow. And it is
for international solutions to the troubling environmental problems
posed by this growth that one looks to the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). It is the purpose
of this paper to explore the structure, history and some current
activities of IMCO in an effort to evaluate whether IMCO is ca-
pable of providing such solutions.
II. IMCO: GENERAL BACKGROUND
IMCO is the specialized agency of the United Nations
charged with responsibility in the area of maritime affairs. The
Convention creating IMCO was drawn up at a United Nations
Maritime Conference held in Geneva from February 19 to March 6,
1948, and. came into force on March 17, 1958.6 Article 1 of the
IMCO Convention provides that the purposes of the organization
are as follows:
(a) To provide machinery for co-operation among Govern-
ments in the field of governmental regulation and practices
relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping en-
gaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adop-
tion of the highest practicable standards in matters concern-
ing maritime safety and efficiency of navigation;
(b) To encourage the removal of discriminatory action and
4 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
105 (1975).
5 Id. at 6-10.
6 Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
done March 6, 1948, [1958] 1 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48, as
amended, Sept. 15, 1964, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 6285, 607 U.N.T.S.
276, Sept. 28, 1965, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 4855, T.I.A.S. No. 6490, 649 U.N.T.S. 334
(hereinafter cited as IMCO Convention).
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unnecessary restrictions by Governments affecting shipping
engaged in international trade so as to promote the availability
of shipping services to the commerce of the world without dis-
crimination; assistance and encouragement given by a Govern-
ment for the development of its national shipping and for pur-
poses of security does not in itself constitute discrimination,
provided that such assistance and encouragement is not based
on measures designed to restrict the freedom of shipping of all
flags to take part in international trade;
(c) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of
matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping con-
cerns in accordance with Part II;
(d) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of
any matters concerning shipping that may be referred to it by
any organ or specialized agency of the United Nations;
(e) To provide for the exchange of information among Gov-
ernments on matters under consideration by the Organization.
Article 2 of the IMCO Convention specifically provides, "The
function of the Organization shall be consultative and advisory."
IMCO, in other words, is "neither a legislative body as such nor
a regulatory agency" 7 and its functions are necessarily limited.
While it can make recommendations to governments, it has no pow-
er, absent delegation by specific treaty provision, to implement
such recommendations on its own.
Despite the fact that there is no mention in the IMCO Con-
vention of "pollution," IMCO has been the dominant international
agency in the area of vessel source pollution. It has been given
coordinating responsibility under a number of significant conven-
tions relating to control of pollution at sea. These include:
(a) The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (the "1954 Oil Pollution Conven-
tion");8 (b) The International Convention Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties,
1969 (the "Intervention Convention");9 (c) The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(the "Liability Convention");10 (d) The International Convention
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensa-
tion for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (the "Fund Conven-
O'Connell, Reflections on Brussels: IMCO and the 1969 Pollution Conventions,
3 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 161, 162, (1970).
8 Opened for signature, May 12, 1954, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No.
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force for the United States Dec. 8, 1961), as
amended, April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S.
332.
9 Done Nov. 29, 1969; 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970).
10 Done Nov. 29, 1969; 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970).
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tion");1I and (e) The International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (the "1973 Ship Pollution
Convention").12
Further, IMCO has over the years developed and submitted rec-
ommendations and other guidelines to governments relating to the
prevention of marine pollution from ships. 13
IMCO has been subject to sharp criticism from the environ-
mental community. International standards promulgated under
its auspices have been challenged as inadequate, and IMCO itself
has been challenged as an "agency that is dominated by the ship-
ping industry and that has always adopted the lowest common
denominator,' 14 as "an organization [which was] established es-
sentially to meet the needs of the major maritime interests of the
world and remains considerably influenced by them,"' i and as
"[an organization with] undue susceptibility to the influence of
predominately maritime interests." 16
To some extent these criticisms are misdirected. If one exam-
ines the achievements of IMCO, especially over the last half
dozen years, it is remarkable to note the number of agreements
which have been successfully negotiated under its auspices. Yet
until the spring of 1975 not a single agreement negotiated since 1966
had yet come into force.17 Many of the marine pollution problems
which we suffer from today are, therefore, more appropriately as-
cribed to the nations of the world which have delayed bringing
these agreements into force, rather than to IMCO itself as a forum
for achieving agreement.
Much of the criticism of IMCO, however, is well-founded.
Its Very structure has been unsuited for dealing in an appropriately
vigorous fashion with marine pollution issues, and the history of
its activities has been far from satisfactory. Further, despite recent
structural changes, its responsiveness still appears limited.
11 Done Dec. 18, 1971; 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 284 (1972).
12 Done Nov. 2, 1973; I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35 (Nov. 2, 1973);
12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973).
13 IMCO, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARTIME CONSULTATIVE
ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO SHIPPING AND RELATED MARITIME MATTERS (1974)
(hereinafter cited as IMCO ACTIVITIES).
14 Frank, The Law at Sea, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, (Magazine), at 14, 63.
15 R. HALLMAN, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND LAW OF THE SEA 49
(1974).
16 Sandbrook & Yurchyshyn, Marine Pollution from Vessels, in CRITICAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 19, 26 (Stein ed. 1975).
17 IMCO ACTIVITIES at annex 2.
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF IMCO: A MARITIME BIAS
Structure has been IMCO's basic problem from its inception.
As noted above, the IMCO Convention does not establish en-
vironmental protection as one of the organization's purposes.
Without a strong mandate in this area, it is perhaps questionable
whether IMCO can ever become the driving force behind efforts
to protect the marine environment. While establishment of a sepa-
rate Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) within
IMCO in November, 1973, with a mandate to "execute and co-
ordinate all activities of the Organization relating to the preven-
tion and control of pollution of the marine environment from
ships,"18 was plainly a step in the right direction, more institution-
alization of pollution prevention goals is clearly needed.19
The difficulties engendered by the absence of an explicit en-
vironmental purpose in IMCO's mandate have been compounded
by the membership and voting scheme established under the
IMCO Convention, which has permitted the domination of the
organization by maritime and shipping interests. IMCO has three
principal organs: the Assembly, the Council, and the Maritime
Safety Committee (the "MSC"). 2°  The Assembly is the "su-
preme governing body" of IMCO and normally meets only once
every two years; the Council supervises the execution of the work
program and performs the functions of the governing body between
sessions of the Assembly; and the MSC is responsible for the
technical work of IMCO. 21 All three organs make decisions based
on majority voting. However, only the Assembly is composed of
all members of IMCO.22 The Council and the MSC, IMCO's
major operating organs, have much more limited membership.
The Council consists of 16 members, composed as follows: six
from nations "with the largest interest in providing international
shipping services"; six from nations "with the largest interest in
18 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.297 (VIII) (Nov. 23, 1973). See generally
section IV entitled THE HISTORY OF IMCO: Too LITTLE, Too LATE, infra.
19 This need has, indeed, been recognized by the members of IMCO themselves,
and a proposal was adopted at the ninth regular session of the Assembly of the
organization held November 3-14, 1975, to amend the IMCO Convention to in-
clude "prevention of pollution from ships" within its statement of purposes.
20 IMCO Convention, Article 12.
21 IMCO ACTIVITIES at 7-8.
22 IMCO, it should be noted, is open to membership by all member states of the
United Nations and by other states in accordance with the provisions of Articles
5-11 of the IMCO Convention. At the end of 1975, IMCO had 91 full members.
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international seaborne trade"; and six from nations "which have
special interest in maritime transport or navigation . . . [which]
will ensure the representation of all major geographic areas of the
world."23 The MSC consists of 16 members, composed as fol-
lows: eight from nations "elected from among the ten largest ship-
owning states" and eight from nations "having an important in-
terest in maritime safety [such as an interest] . . . in the supply
of large numbers of crews. ... "24 Clearly then, the major
maritime interests have been in a position to exert very substantial
control over IMCO's actions, and it is easy to see how economic
self-interest may outweigh the interest in protection of the en-
vironment in IMCO's decision-making.25
Recently, there has been a movement toward change within
the structure of IMCO. In recognition of the fact that there was
an imbalance of interests on marine pollution issues crucial to all
states, proposals have been made, and have now been accepted
by the Assembly, to expand the membership of both the Council
and the MSC.26 At the eighth session of the Assembly, held in
November 1973, a resolution was adopted pursuant to which an Ad
Hoc Working Group, open to all members of IMCO was con-
vened with a mandate "to study any proposed amendments to the
IMCO Convention concerning the size and composition of the
Council and the Maritime Safety Committee and any conse-
quential related amendments."27 The Ad Hoc Working Group
met in February 1974, and formulated proposals for amendments
to the Articles of the IMCO Convention concerning the size and
23 IMCO Convention, art. 17. Originally the Council consisted of 16
members with six members from each of the first two categories. Article 17 was
amended in 1964, supra note 6, to expand Council membership to 18 and to add
the third membership category.
2 IMCO Convention, art. 28. The MSC consisted of 14 members prior to a
1965 amendment, supra note 6.
25 The influence of the maritime powers has additionally been reflected in
international agreements negotiated under the auspices of IMCO. For example,
the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention will not come into force by its own terms,
until ratified by "not less than 15 states, the combined merchant fleets of which
constitute not less than 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant
shipping. .... ." International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, art. 15, para. 1. Similarly, any amendment to that Convention is not
deemed to have been accepted unless it is ratified by "two-thirds of the Parties,
the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 percent of the
gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet." Id. art. 16, para. 2(f)(i).
IMCO Assembly Resolution A.314 (VIII) (November 23, 1973).
27 For a description of its work, see generally the Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Assembly Resolution A.314 (VIII), WGAI/3 (Feb. 12, 1974).
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composition of the Council and MSC. Thirty-seven countries,
including a variety of developing countries, participated in this ef-
fort.
The proposals of the Working Group were adopted by the
Assembly at its fifth extraordinary session on October 17, 1974.28
These proposals, which will come into force upon ratification by
two-thirds of IMCO's members, expand the size of the Council
from 18 to 24 members and change its composition as follows: six
members will come from "states with the largest interest in pro-
viding international shipping services"; six members will come
from "states with the largest interest in international seaborne
trade"; and 12 members will come from other states which "have
special interests in maritime transport or navigation, and whose
election to the Council would ensure the representation of all ma-
jor geographic areas of the world." Further, they would eliminate
the restricted composition of the MSC: as amended, the IMCO
Convention would merely read, "the Maritime Safety Committee
shall consist of all the members." These amendments, of course,
still leave the maritime states in substantial control of the Council
and in a position to block progressive reforms. Thus, the practical
effect of such changes, if adopted, may be imperceptible, and it is
far too early to tell whether the next few years will see a shift in
IMCO towards a more balanced approach to the marine pollution
problem.
IV. THE HISTORY OF IMCO: Too LITTLE, Too LATE
If the composition of the Council and the MSC has raised
questions in the past as to the orientation of IMCO, its history,
especially over the first years of its operations, bears out a mixed
appraisal of its accomplishments. The IMCO Convention came
into force on March 17, 1958, and the first session of the Assembly
of IMCO was held in London from January 6 to January 19, 1959.
For the next 10 years, however, LMCO accomplished little in the
way of protection of the marine environment. 29  From 1959
through 1969, only one formal IMCO conference was devoted ex-
clusively to the issue of pollution. This was the conference con-
vened at London in April 1962, to adopt amendments to the 1954
Oil Pollution Convention. The amendments agreed upon, how-
ever, represented only marginal improvement in the regulation of
28 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.315 (ES.V) (Oct. 17, 1974).
29 For a history of the early years of IMCO, see generally Johnson, IMCO:
The First Four Years (1959-1962), 12 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 31 (1963).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
oil tanker traffic. Their main achievements were merely to extend
the application of the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention to ships of a
lesser gross tonnage and to extend the zones in which the dis-
charge of persistent oil was prohibited. 30
The years 1969 through 1973 saw a flurry of activity at IMCO.
Spurred by the Torrey Canyon incident in March 1967, and the
entry onto the world scene of "supertankers" after the closure of
the Suez Canal in June of 1967, the international community
negotiated, under the auspices of IMCO, a spate of agreements,
including: amendments in 1969 and 1971 to the 1954 Oil Pollution
Convention; the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention; the Intervention
Convention; the Liability Convention; and the Fund Convention.
The IMCO Assembly, moreover, went on record at the beginning
of the decade as seeking to develop a program to reduce radi-
cally vessel source pollution. In 1971, the seventh regular session
of the Assembly decided upon the institutional goal, to be effec-
tuated by the International Conference on Marine Pollution of
1973, of:
the achievement, by 1975 if possible but certainly by the end of
the decade, of the complete elimination of the willful and inten-
tional pollution of the seas by oil and noxious substances other
than oil, and a minimization of accidental spills.31
Because the agreements negotiated over the past half dozen
years are either not yet in force or have only recently come into
force, it is clearly too early to assess fully the impact of IMCO's
initiatives in the marine pollution area. Yet some tentative con-
clusions may be drawn, and these conclusions are not wholly posi-
tive.
The 1969 and 1971 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pollution Con-
vention may be taken as examples of the timidity of IMCO's ef-
forts. These amendments merely codify existing industry practice
as far as operational discharges and tank sizes, respectively, are
concerned. The 1969 amendments essentially mandate continued
use of "load on top" procedure to reduce the effluent content of
ballast discharges - a tank cleaning and loading technique fol-
lowed on some 75 percent of existing tonnage at the time the
amendments were adopted.32 Further, they permit the discharge
30 See Amendments to the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, adopted April 11,
1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332. For a discus-
sion of such amendments see Johnson, supra note 30, at 51-55.
31 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.237 (VII) (Oct. 12, 1971).
32 See Porricelli, Keith and Storch, Tankers and the Ecology, (paper presented
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of up to one fifteen-thousandth of a tanker's cargo per voyage.
Consequently, a 300,000 deadweight ton (dwt) tanker may dis-
charge almost 20 tons of oil per voyage. Thus, they do little to
bring about a significant decrease in the amounts of oil discharged
into the ocean as a result of normal tanker operations. Similarly,
the 1971 amendments represent virtually no improvement over
current practice. The agreed upon tank size limitations are at the
top of the scale of what is now incorporated on "supertankers."
These limitations allow 141,519 barrels to be contained in any
single wing tank and 314,487 barrels to be contained in any center
tank. Obviously, the complete loss of cargo from a single tank
meeting these size limitations would be environmentally di-
sastrous.
Even at the time that the 1969 and 1971 amendments were
agreed upon, it was obvious that something more was required,
and thus the IMCO Assembly, on October 21, 1969, decided:
to convene, in 1973, an international conference on marine pol-
lution for the purpose of preparing a suitable international
agreement for placing restraints on the contamination of the sea,
land and air by ships, vessels, and other equipment operating in
the marine environment. 33
Almost 4 years of preparatory work were devoted to this confer-
ence, at which the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention was negotiated.
There were high hopes for its outcome. At the opening of the
conference, on October 8, 1973, Russell E. Train, chairman of
the United States Delegation, underscored the importance of the
conference's tasks and the necessity of bringing marine pollution
under control:
Among the challenges to mankind, few are more critical than the
need to protect the marine environment. All nations have a ma-
jor stake in the continued healthy functioning of the natural sys-
tems of the oceans. Preserving the marine organisms upon
which much of our global oxygen balance depends, the protection
of both deepwater and coastal fisheries, safeguarding the es-
tuarine areas upon which the generation of much marine life
depends, the protection of beaches and shoreline areas for recrea-
tion and growing world tourism - these are vital concerns of all
countries.
The international community has determined, in major re-
at the annual meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
Nov., 1971).
33 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.176 (VI) (Oct. 21, 1969).
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
cent forums and pronouncements, that pollution of the seas
from vessel discharges must be prevented, and in particular,
that intentional oil pollution must be terminated during this
decade. We meet today to carry out those resolves.
It is vitally important that we do so. Our coastal popula-
tions and resources have already suffered the consequences of
vessel pollution incidents, and the dramatic increase of sea-
borne commerce in hazardous substances . . . could ulti-
mately upset the healthy functioning of the natural systems of
the oceans. Although that ultimate environmental catastrophe
is not yet upon us, we must nevertheless proceed with a gen-
uine sense of urgency. 34
It is questionable whether the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention
comes near to fulfilling Chairman Train's hopes. Although the
Convention does extend international regulation to white or "non-
persistent" as well as black oils, require oil discharge monitoring
and control equipment on new and existing tankers, and provide
that new, large oil tankers be constructed with segregated ballast
tanks in order to prevent operational pollution, its achievements are
limited as far as oil pollution is concerned. The discharge stan-
dards agreed upon are basically those of the 1969 amendments and
the tank size limitations agreed upon are basically those of the 1971
amendments. Segregated ballast, although found by the United
States to be feasible on tankers as small as 20,000 dwt,35 is only
mandated for vessels larger than 70,000 dwt, and there is no provi-
sion that segregated ballast be achieved through incorporation of a
double bottom - a feature which would go a long way toward
eliminating outflows due to groundings. Likewise, there are no
prov isions relating to maneuverability or stopping ability of tankers,
although improvements in this area are desperately needed to reduce
the risk of tanker accidents. Finally, the failure to require retrofit
of segregated ballast capacity, as well as other design features,
virtually assures that the design and construction requirements of
the Convention will be dead letters. A tanker construction boom in
the years 1970 through 1974 has resulted in a glut of tankers on
the market, and few new tankers, particularly supertankers, are
3 Statement of the Hon. Russell E. Train, chairman, United States Dele-
gation to the 1973 Marine Pollution Conference, London, 8 October 1973.
35 See U.S. Coast Guard, Reports on Parts 1 and 2 of Study I, Segregated
Ballast Tankers (June 1972 and Feb. 1973); U.S. Coast Guard, Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement on the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships 50 (N.T.I.S. Order No. EIS 73-1391-D, filed Sep. 4, 1973).
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going be to contracted for over the next 10 years. 36 As one com-
mentator has stated:
Though the 1973 Convention may bring about a considerable
reduction in the discharge of oil and other harmful substances
from ships, economic and technological factors have prevented
the imposition of regulations that would totally eliminate vessel
generated pollution. Thus the 1973 Convention fails to meet
the 1971 IMCO Assembly's stated objectives of achieving by
1975 if possible, and certainly by the end of the decade, the com-
plete elimination of the willful and intentional pollution of the
sea by oil and noxious substances other than oil, and the minimiza-
tion of accidental spills.
37
V. HOPES FOR THE FUTURE: Two RECENT CASE HISTORIES
Despite the shortcomings of the 1973 Ship Pollution Conven-
tion, there can be no question but that IMCO has become more
responsive to the needs of the environment over the past half dozen
years. But is it responsive enough? How much have things really
changed? What can one expect from IMCO in the future? Al-
though any predictions of this nature are necessarily speculative,
two recent case histories, one involving substantive regulation, and
one involving procedural reform, indicate that one's hopes for the
future must be tempered by a recognition of the frailties of the
organization.
A. Gas Inerting Systems: The Difficulty of
Going Beyond the Lowest Common Denominator
The difficulties in achieving meaningful substantive agreement
even on relatively simple issues is well exemplified by a recent
IMCO Assembly Resolution regarding gas inerting systems. 3
8
Explosions aboard partially loaded tank vessels present a seri-
3 As set forth in a speech delivered by W.H. Mueller of Exxon Corporation
at the Sea Trade Conference in London on March 18, 1975, existing tonnage of
medium size tankers and supertankers already exceeds both current and forecasted
requirements of the next ten years. Mr. Mueller's figures show a projected
tonnage surplus for 1975 of approximately 55 million dwts increasing to about
130 million dwt by 1977 on the basis of current orders. Even if not a single new
order is placed - and there seems to be little incentive to place such an order at
this time - substantial excess capacity will exist through 1985. Thus, it is un-
likely that design and construction requirements applying to new tankers only will
have much impact.
37 Note, No Dumping in this Ocean: Nearing the End of Ship Generated Pollution,
7 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L LAW AND POLITIcs 545, 547 (1974).
38 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.271 (VIII) (Nov. 20, 1973).
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ous threat to the marine environment. United States Coast Guard
statistics indicate that during the period 1969-1972, tanker explo-
sions resulted in a total outflow of over 90,000 tons of oil - approxi-
mately 11 percent of the total outflow from tankers due to casualties
of all types. 39 If the amount of oxygen in a cargo tank is reduced
below a threshhold concentration, then combustion is impossible.
This reduction can be accomplished by filling cargo tanks with an
inert gas. A gas inerting system, which involves installation of
equipment to cool, wash and deliver flue gases from the boiler
to cargo tanks, 40 "virtually eliminates the possibility of an explosive
mixture being formed by cargo vapors" and thus virtually elimi-
nates this source of pollution.41
Gas inerting systems were first introduced by a United States
oil company in 1925, and systems similar to those now in use were
developed by Sun Oil Company of Philadelphia in 1932.42 At least
one major oil company made a decision as early as 1963 to fit all
new crude oil vessels with inerting gas systems. In 1968, that
company began ordering product carriers fitted with such sys-
tems.43  A series of disastrous explosions which occurred during
the period 1969-1971 in non-inerted vessels, including the 208,000
dwt Mactra, the 206,000 dwt Marpessa and the 219,000 dwt King
Haakon VIII, underscored the necessity of mandating the incor-
poration of gas inerting systems both for safety and pollution
control. Indeed, at the beginning of 1973, it was recommended to
the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry that all
supertankers, both those being constructed and those already in
service, be fitted with inert gas systems, 4 furthermore, in mid-
1973, the Federal Maritime Administration in the United States
moved independently to require gas inerting systems on all sub-
sidized U.S. flag oil tankers larger than 100,000 dwt.4s
39 DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PORTS AND WATER-
WAYS SAFETY ACT OF 1972, Table B2, at 32 (June 1974).
40 For a discussion of gas inerting systems, see generally Day, Platt, et al.,
The Development and Operation of an Inert Gas System for Oil Tankers, (paper pre-
sented to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 1971) [hereinafter cited as
"Day"]; Porricelli, Keith and Storch, note 32 supra.
41 FEDERAL MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT ON TANKER CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM VI-69 (N.T.I.S. Rep. No. EIS 730725-F,
filed May 30, 1973).
42 Day, supra note 40, at 3.
43 Id. at 4.
44 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 2, 1973, at 8.
4s Federal Maritime Administration, Final Opinion and Order of Maritime
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IMCO did not take the lead in promoting a gas inerting system
requirement and, indeed, did not take action until 1973, in part in
response to pressure from its member states which were already in
the process of taking unilateral actions. At the eighth session of
the Assembly in November, 1973, however, a resolution was
adopted calling upon member states to put into effect certain draft
recommendations made by the Subcommittee on Fire Protection of
the Maritime Safety Council concerning fire safety measures for
tankers and combination carriers.46 In particular, the IMCO As-
sembly Resolution calls upon member states to require incorpora-
tion of gas inerting systems on crude oil tankers of 100,000 dwt or
more and crude oil combination carriers of 50,000 dwt or more that
have keels already laid or that are at a comparable stage of con-
struction on or after July 1, 1974.
Three basic points can be made about IMCO's action, each of
which underscores the difficulty in relying upon IMCO for provid-
ing solutions to marine pollution problems.
First, the IMCO action came not as a progressive reform but as
a somewhat tardy recognition of a need long perceived by others.
When the IMCO Assembly adopted Resolution A.271, gas inerting
systems, pioneered over 40 years earlier, were already widely ac-
cepted, and indeed, after the accidents of the late 60's and early
70's, most major oil companies had moved independently to put
such systems at least on their larger vessels. IMCO action, there-
fore, represented once again merely the issuance of an international
stamp of approval, designed to some extent to eliminate any com-
petitive disadvantage suffered by owners of inerted vessels, to an
already widespread industry practice.
Second, the IMCO action itself has numerous deficiencies and
in effect, represents a "lowest common denominator" compromise.
The gas inerting system requirement proposed applies only to
larger vessels, although casualty data indicate that explosion poten-
tial is at least as great among vessels below 100,000 dwt as it is
among larger vessels.47 The gas inerting system requirement
proposed applies only to crude oil carriers, although explosion
potential equally exists for carriers of refined products and, as
noted above, petroleum companies have installed such systems on
product carriers in the past to reduce explosion risks. The gas
Subsidy Board, MarAd Tanker Construction Program, Docket No. A-75 (Aug.
30, 1973).
46 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.271 (VIII) (Nov. 20, 1973).
41 See, e.g., Porricelli, Keith and Storch, supra note 32.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
inerting system requirement proposed applies only to new vessels,
although, as noted above, there may be very few new vessels built
over the next 10 years. The gas inerting system requirement pro-
posed does not specify inert gas quality, although inert gas quality
may be a significant factor in reducing corrosion rates and thus
ultimately reducing the risk of structural failure, one of the leading
causes of accidental spillage.48
Third, even with all its limitations, there is no assurance that an
Assembly resolution containing a "recommendation" to member
governments will be implemented. Liberia, by far the most signi-
ficant nation in terms of total tonnage, has informed IMCO that it
cannot implement the resolution by the recommended date, while
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also advised
IMCO that they cannot establish a standard application to ships
that have keels already laid or that are at a comparable stage of
construction after July 1, 1974. 49 In the United States, the Coast
Guard did not adopt regulations implementing the recommendation
until January 1976, and the application date ultimately chosen was
January 1, 1975, rather than July 1, 1974.50 These delays indicate
again that because IMCO does not have the power to promulgate
enforceable regulations, even its best efforts to combat marine
pollution may ultimately be frustrated.
B. The MEPC: A Legacy of Inertia
If the history of the gas inerting system requirement reveals the
limited nature of some of IMCO's substantive accomplishments, so
do the first 2 years of the MEPC's existence reveal how the tradi-
tional bias and inertia of the organization may undercut some of
IMCO's touted procedural reforms.
Perhaps the most significant structural initiative within IMCO
during the last several years has been the creation of the MEPC.
The MEPC is responsible for coordinating and administering
IMCO's activities regarding the prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships - activities previously within the jurisdiction
of the MSC - and its membership is open to all members of the
organization, not just maritime powers. It has been argued by
48 In the period 1969-1972, structural failures resulted in the outflow of almost
300,000 tons of oil or approximately 37 percent of the total accidental spillage.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 39, at 32, table B-2.
49 M.S.C. XXII/5 (Jan. 15, 1975); M.S.C. XXII/5/Add. 1 (Feb. 25, 1975).
so See Tank Vessel Regulations, Structural Fire Protection Requirements, 41
Fed. Reg. 3838 (1976).
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some, as Robert Hallman has reported, that creation of the MEPC
"blunts all prior criticism of IMCO as a tool of maritime inter-
ests and unrepresentative of the international community as a
whole."51 Yet the reality of MEPC is not equal to the expecta-
tions aroused at its creation.
The MEPC was first formally proposed in a speech by the
Honorable Russell E. Train before the Council of IMCO on June
5, 1973. In that speech, Mr. Train laid out a proposal for the
creation within the organizational structure of IMCO of a "new
permanent body to exercise its environmental responsibilities." As
Chairman Train foresaw it, that new committee would "coordinate
and administer all IMCO activities concerning marine pollution."
It would "exercise the authority conferred on the Organization to
adopt and revise regulations under international conventions for the
prevention and control of vessel source pollution." Further, it
would "consider on a continuing basis all related matters pertain-
ing to pollution of -the sea . . . disseminate scientific technical
and economic information concerning ocean pollution and its
control . . . [and] advise member states, particularly developing
countries, on technical matters and provide practical information,
recommendations and guidelines. . . ." concerning the effects of
and means for preventing or mitigating marine pollution. Creation
of the MEPC would, in Chairman Train's words, ensure that
IMCO would "play a coordinated, efficient and dynamic role for
the protection and improvement of the environment."
The establishment of MEPC itself, at the eighth session of the
Assembly in November 1973, corresponds roughly with Chairman
Train's proposal.52 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.297 estab-
lishes the MEPC with the following Terms of Reference: s3
To assist IMCO in its consultation with other bodies within the
United Nations system, especially the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, and with other international organizations
and expert bodies in the field of marine pollution, and to co-
ordinate and administer, in consultation as appropriate with
other bodies of IMCO, the activities of the Organization con-
cerning the prevention and control of marine pollution from
ships and in particular:
(a) To perform such functions as are or may be conferred
upon the Organization under international conventions for the
51 R. HALLMAN, supra note 15, at 48.
52 Speech by the Honorable Russell E. Train before the Council of IMCO
on June 5, 1973.
53 IMCO Assembly Resolution A.297 (VIII) (Nov. 23, 1973).
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prevention and control of pollution from ships, particularly with
respect to the adoption or amendment of regulations or other
provisions, as provided for in such conventions;
(b) To consider appropriate measures to facilitate the en-
forcement of the Conventions referred to in paragraph (a) above;
(c) To provide for the acquisition and dissemination of
scientific, technical and any other practical information on the
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships to States,
particularly developing countries, and, where appropriate, to
make recommendations and to develop guidelines;
(d) To promote cooperation with regional organizations
concerned with the prevention of marine pollution from ships;
(e) To consider and take appropriate action with respect to
any other matters falling within the scope of the Organization
which would contribute to the prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships including cooperation on environmental
matters with other international organizations.
The MEPC, as originally conceived, was meant to be an engine
for reform within IMCO. Yet more than 2 years have passed since
its creation, and it has done little to justify that initial conception.
In that 2-year span it has only met four times - in March 1974; No-
vember 1974; June 1975; and October, 1975 - and, to date, it can only
list a single significant accomplishment: the acceptance of a list of
hazardous substances to be annexed to a Protocol negotiated in
1973, extending the scope of the Intervention Convention to sub-
stances other than black oils. It has taken no positive action with
regard to two matters of urgent importance to the implementation
of the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention: the development of means
to ensure the provision and maintenance of adequate reception
facilities in ports,5 4 and the development of performance standards
for oil discharge monitoring and control equipment.55  The in-
ability of states to meet these provisions of the Convention may
well be major stumbling blocks to its acceptance, and any delay by
the MEPC almost surely delays the ratification process. More-
over, even assuming the Convention did enter into force, until
MEPC takes action with regard to reception facilities and dis-
charge monitoring, the effect of the Convention would be severely
limited.
MEPC seems to be functioning as an elaborate postponement
mechanism. Many of the items referred from MEPC I to MEPC
II were carried over to MEPC III, and many of the items referred
from MEPC II to MEPC III were carried over to MEPC IV and
54 1973 Ship Pollution Convention, supra note 12, Annex I, Regulation 12.
55 Id. reg. 16.
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have again been carried over to MEPC (scheduled to be held in
May 1976). The snail's pace of previous international activity to
combat marine pollution seems, in other words, to be characterizing
MEPC as well.
A significant test of MEPC's ability to seize the marine pollu-
tion initative may now be emerging. At its third session, held in
June 1974, MEPC took note of a proposal, submitted through the
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (not, it might be noted, through its own members or staff)
that IMCO initiate international action towards converting idle
tanker capacity into segregated ballast on existing tankers.56 In-
corporation of a segregated ballast system is the method best suited
to achieve the complete elimination of operational pollution,57 and
such a proposal, if adopted, would go a long way toward meeting
IMCO's own stated pollution prevention goals. Indeed, if not
adopted, the intent of the international community, as evidenced in
the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention, to shift to a segregated ballast
standard for larger tankers may well be completely frustrated.
Further, imposition of such a requirement would have the economic
and political advantage of reducing the need for large, expensive
reception facilities for dirty ballast, thereby perhaps facilitating
acceptance of the 1973 Ship Pollution Convention, and providing
needed business for both tanker owners and operators with idled
tonnage and for shipyards which are no longer getting new orders.
At the third session of the MEPC, some delegations expressed
interest, in principle, in the proposal to require retrofit for segre-
gated ballast capacity. But action was not taken which would
permit a rapid determination on this matter. All that was done was
to request the International Chamber of Shipping and the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum to consider the suggestion
and report to MEPC on their findings by the end of 1975.58
These two organizations are, of course, industry trade associations,
which are unlikely to support any suggestion unless it is clearly in
their own economic self-interest. MEPC, in other words, may be
following the pattern of inertia set by other IMCO organs in the
past: relying on industry to define the scope and content of its
inquiries and only promoting or adopting marine pollution initi-
atives if they are acceptable to and indeed often already accepted
56 See Report of the Marine Environment Protection Comm. on Its Third
Session, MEPC 111/18, at 96-101 (July 7, 1975).
57 See Note 35 supra.
58 See Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Third
Session, MEPC 111/18, 96-101 (July 7, 1975).
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by industry. Whether MEPC will take the lead in pushing this
significant environmental proposal thus remains uncertain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adequacy of IMCO as the international mechanism for
combatting marine pollution is yet to be demonstrated. IMCO
can, of course, be no more effective than its member nations desire
or permit it to be, and commercial maritime interests seem likely
to continue to play the most powerful role in its deliberations.
What is necessary, therefore, beyond the current structural reforms,
is a shift in political consciousness in both maritime and non-mari-
time states, and a recognition that it is in the interest of all nations
to act quickly and forcefully in order to meet the goals which the
IMCO Assembly itself adopted in 1971: the complete elimination
of operational pollution and the minimization of accidental pollu-
tion by the end of this decade. If such a shift does not occur then,
in the foreseeable future, much greater reliance may have to be
placed on unilateral state action, rather than multilateral agree-
ment, to achieve environmentally desirable goals.
Every day that passes without affirmative action increases the
risk that, sooner rather than later, the limits of the assimilative
capacity of the oceans will be reached. The National Academy of
Sciences has concluded:
A basic question that remains unanswered is "At what level of
petroleum hydrocarbon input into the ocean might we find ir-
reversible damage occurring?" The sea is an enormously com-
plex system about which our knowledge is very imperfect. The
ocean may be able to accommodate petroleum hydrocarbon
inputs far above those occurring today. On the other hand, the
damage level may be with an order of magnitude of present in-
puts to the sea. Unless we come closer to answering this basic
question, it seems wisest to continue our efforts in the inter-
national control of inputs and to push forward research to reduce
our current level of uncertainty.5 9
Whether the international community, acting through IMCO, will
properly heed this warning remains to be seen.
59 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 107.
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